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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 15-2006
___________

CALIPH ALJA-IZ,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS BOARD OF EDUCATION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(D.C. Civil No. 3-14-cv-00043)
District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gómez
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect, Dismissal Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and
I.O.P. 10.6
August 6, 2015
Before: CHAGARES SCIRCA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 28, 2015)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Caliph Alja-Iz (“Alja-Iz”) brought a discrimination suit against
the Virgin Islands Board of Education (“the Board”). He now appeals the District

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute
binding precedent.

Court’s order dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. Because that appeal
presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See
3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Alja-Iz filed a complaint alleging that the Board failed to issue him teaching
certificates in violation of several federal statutes: (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12112; (2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d; and (3) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2.
The Board answered the complaint, after which the District Court sua sponte notified the
parties that it was considering dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Alja-Iz filed a brief arguing against dismissal, and the
Board filed a brief in favor of dismissal in conjunction with a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The District Court then dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In
its dismissal order, the District Court gave Alja-Iz 15 days to file an amended complaint.
Instead of amending his complaint, Alja-Iz appealed the dismissal.
II.
First, we must consider our jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Alja-Iz’s
decision to appeal from a dismissal that gave him leave to amend his complaint presents a
potential jurisdictional issue. With some exceptions, we have jurisdiction over appeals
only from final decisions of the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Generally, an
order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor appealable
2

because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the cause of
action.” Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
“Only if the plaintiff cannot amend or declares his intention to stand on his complaint
does the order become final and appealable.” Id. at 952. Although there is no “clear rule
for determining when a party has elected to stand on his or her complaint,” Hagan v.
Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2009), we have exercised jurisdiction when a plaintiff
fails to amend within the time provided by the District Court, see Batoff v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992).
Here, we will infer Alja-Iz’s intention to stand on his complaint. The District
Court dismissed Alja-Iz’s complaint and granted Alja-Iz 15 days to amend it. Instead of
filing an amended complaint, Alja-Iz filed a notice of appeal 21 days later. As a result,
the District Court’s order is a final, appealable order. See id.
III.
Turning to the merits, we discern no error in the District Court’s decision to
dismiss Alja-Iz’s complaint because the complaint lacked sufficient factual material to
state a discrimination claim based on the Board’s alleged refusal to grant Alja-Iz the
certifications he sought.
Our review of the District Court’s dismissal order is plenary. See Huertas v.
Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 2011); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198,
205 (3d Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A
3

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting and citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007)). We may summarily affirm a District Court’s
order if there is no substantial question presented in the appeal, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4;
I.O.P. 10.6, and we may rely on any grounds supported by the record, see Hughes v.
Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).1
Although a pro se plaintiff like Alja-Iz is given some leeway in meeting the
Federal Rules’ pleading requirements, see Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d
Cir. 2003), even under that relaxed standard, there is no substantial question that the
complaint failed to state a claim, see Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015)

The District Court’s order dismissing the complaint analyzed the motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) following its sua sponte order,
rather than discussing the Board’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The two standards are effectively the same, and we apply
the same plenary review to a dismissal based on either of those rules. See Knepper v.
Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2012); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2
(3d Cir. 2004).
1

Also, the District Court’s order appears to contain language that is relevant to
another of its opinions in a different case involving Alja-Iz, in which the District Court
dismissed a similar employment-discrimination complaint against the Virgin Islands
Department of Education. See Caliph Alja-Iz v. United States Virgin Islands Department
of Education, District Court of the Virgin Islands, No. 3:14-cv-00042. The language in
the order appealed from here refers repeatedly to claims against the Virgin Islands
Department of Education, and also analyzes claims under statutes that Alja-Iz cited in his
lawsuit against the Virgin Islands Department of Education in 3:14-cv-00042, but not in
his lawsuit against the Virgin Islands Board of Education in 3:14-cv-00043. None of this,
4

(holding that a pro se complaint must still meet Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility
standard).
A covered entity will be liable under the ADA only if it knew of the disability at
issue. See Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 380 (3d Cir. 2002); Jones v.
United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 2000) (“It is, of course, an axiom of any
ADA claim that the plaintiff be disabled and that the employer be aware of the
disability.”). Here, Alja-Iz never alleged that the Board was aware of any purported
disability when it made its decision not to grant him the certifications he sought, which is
sufficient on its own to dispose of Alja-Iz’s claim under the ADA.
Moreover, even assuming that Alja-Iz is disabled within the meaning of the ADA
and that the Board was aware of a disability, Alja-Iz’s complaint still failed to state a
claim for disability discrimination. Other than the legal conclusion that the Board failed
to issue him certifications “in violation of” the ADA and “because the plaintiff is a
disabled highly qualified professional teacher certification applicant,” Alja-Iz never
alleged any facts to suggest that the Board denied him certification “because of” his
disability or “as a result of discrimination” on the basis of disability, as the ADA
requires. CG v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2013); Hohider
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 186 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

however, changes the outcome of this appeal, as the record in this case makes clear that
Alja-Iz failed to state a claim against the Board.
5

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The only even potentially relevant facts in the
complaint are that Alja-Iz received “negative emails” from a representative of the Board,
who allegedly told him that he “will not even get a professional certification application
to apply for an education professional certification nor will the plaintiff . . . be certified as
an educational professional in the United States Virgin Islands.”2
There is even less to Alja-Iz’s claims under Title VI and Title VII. Alja-Iz never
pleaded even the bare legal conclusion that he failed to received certifications as a result
of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or any other characteristic protected under
either of those statutes—let alone pleaded any facts sufficient to describe a prima facie
case of discrimination. See Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (setting out the elements of a prima facie case of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin discrimination under Title VII); cf. also Rashdan v.
Geissberger, 764 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2014) (adopting Title VII scheme of proof for
Title VI disparate-treatment claims and recognizing that the Third Circuit has used that
scheme of proof in Title VI cases) (citing Gazarov ex rel. Gazarov v. Diocese of Erie, 80
F. App’x 202, 203-05 (3d Cir. 2003) (nonprecedential)).
Finally, Alja-Iz’s complaint also failed to set out a plausible retaliation claim. To
advance a prima facie case of retaliation a plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in a
protected activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or

For its part, the Board stated in its answer, among other things, that Alja-Iz’s outof-state test scores did not qualify Alja-Iz to receive the certifications he sought in the
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contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the
employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. See Abramson v.
William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, Alja-Iz pleaded
himself out of court, as his complaint alleged that the Board made its decision denying
him certification before he purportedly engaged in the protected activity of filing a
complaint. See Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 2004)
(observing that it is not possible to meet the retaliation standard when the adverse action
precedes the protected activity).
Perhaps Alja-Iz could have corrected these pleading deficiencies in an amended
complaint, but after the District Court granted him leave to amend his complaint, he
declined to do so and instead stood on his complaint as it was initially written. Because
his complaint pleaded no viable claim, this appeal presents us with no substantial
question. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Alja-Iz’s
complaint.

Virgin Islands.
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